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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
ROLLAND BURGESS and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL, JWR 
CONSTRUCTION and WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Petitioners. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROLLAND BURGESS 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-
30(2)(b), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-303(2)(c)(ii), Utah Code Ann. §34A-1 -303(6), Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-801(7), Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801 (8)(a), and Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46B-16 (1953, as amended.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue presented by this appeal 
The only issue in this case is whether Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 empowers the 
Industrial Commission to change and modify its prior findings and orders even after 
the applicable statutes of limitations has run. 
Case No. 970404-CA 
Priority No. 7 
Standard of review 
The appropriate standard of review this court must apply in resolving the issue 
in this case is the correction of error standard. Bruczynski v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes in resolving this case are set forth in full in the 
Addendum to this Brief. Those Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78, 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65(1), Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66 and Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
67 (1953, as amended.)1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
This case involves a claim for workers compensation benefits filed by Mr. 
Burgess. On March 25, 1995 Mr. Burgess filed two Applications for Hearing wi th the 
Industrial Commission of Utah.2 The first Application for Hearing was filed for injuries 
he sustained by accident arising out of and during the course of his employment on 
July 1 , 1990 while working for respondent Siaperas Sand & Gravel. (R. 1) 
The second Application for Hearing was filed for injuries he sustained by 
accident arising out of and during the course of his employment on August 18, 1994 
while working for respondent JWR Construction. (R. 10) 
1
 All references In this brief are to the applicable codes as they were enumerated at the time of the 
industrial accidents. The references are not to the currently applicable Utah Code. 
2Now known as the Labor Commission of Utah. To be consistent, and for purposes of clarity, with the 
history of this case, all references in this brief will be to the Industrial Commission. 
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I" I ic vVorkers Compensation Fi IT id of Utah was the workers compensation carrier 
for each employer and responsible 1 en the payment of appropriate oene?.^ 
ii ^ * •- * vo Applications mi Hearing, m i . durcmss was claiming 
entitieni^r medical expenses, recommended meHi«~al Cd^ "~~- t—q1 
I mi i 
1 I 
accidents or. w«.r 1 990 and o..,wa~wL ^ 1994 _-i *1 and 32-33)- -i .J I 
economy and praciiod. reasons, the two u-uims were consolidated . ^o 
Course of proceedii igs 
An evidentiary hearing was scheduled on August 28, 1 996. (R. 1 87-254) D " ^ r 
ions, The first motion was entitled '"Motion to Amend Appiicatic o tor Hea^ J ,- . 
i 
\. 
his timely filed Applications for Hearing to ii iclude a claim * v permanent total disability 
benefits. (R, I 8J II l HI i) II I IP second i i notion was ent ; , ;^ j 
daid the Applicant's claim for additional benefits.' - 1 85-1 86) 
On November 2.2, " 996 the Administrative Law Judge, Barbc . 
e *" i . ^ h ^ i . i ^ " Ehceno grantee ivii. 
Motion •*• • ms pending Applications * »» neanng and +~ ~!~ ^~~ 
I - gess' Motion to Continue his claims without dare. (R. 295) 
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All the parties filed Motions for Review of Judge Elicerio's November 22, 1996 
Order. (R. 297-310 and 311-31 5) The parties then filed their respective reply to the 
other's motions. (R. 316-330 and 332-336) 
Disposition by the Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission of Utah entered its Order on Motions for Review on 
June 9, 1997. (R. 347-350) The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the 
amendment of Mr. Burgess7 Applications for Hearing. The Industrial Commission of 
Utah did rule that the issues raised by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah in its 
Motion for Review were moot and that it was appropriate to dismiss Mr. Burgess' 
amended Applications for Hearing. (R. 349-350) 
Statement of Facts 
1. Mr. Burgess sustained injuries by accident arising out of and in the course 
of his employment wi th Siaperas Sand & Gravel on July 1, 1990. This accident 
occurred when Mr. Burgess fell approximately 28 feet at the construction site. (R. 1) 
2. Mr. Burgess sustained additional injuries by accident arising out of and in 
the course of his employment wi th JWR Construction on August 18, 1994. This 
accident occurred while Mr. Burgess was lifting plywood forms. (R. 10) 
3. The employers and the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, the workers 
compensation insurance carrier, have accepted liability for the payment of medical 
expenses and certain disability compensation. (R. 2 9 1 , 347) 
4. In the answers to the Applications for Hearing filed by the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, on behalf of the employers, it was admitted that Mr. 
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Burgess did suffer the accidents as alleged in his Applications for Hearing. The 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah did deny that Mr. Burgess was entitled to any 
additional benefits. (R. 29-31 and 32-33) 
5. The two Applications for Hearing were consolidated for hearing. That 
hearing was scheduled before Judge Elicerio on August 28, 1996. (R. 291) 
6. Judge Elicerio approved a compensation hearing on October 28, 1996 
which reflected the acceptance of liability by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. 
(R. 291-292) 
7. At the conclusion of the August 28, 1996 hearing, which was treated by 
Judge Elicerio as an attorney conference, Mr. Burgess filed his Motion to Amend his 
pending Applications for Hearing to include future claims and to join the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund as a party. Mr. Burgess also filed a Motion to Continue without 
date his claim for additional benefits. (R. 182-183, 185-186 and 292) 
8. The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah filed its responses to Mr. Burgess' 
motions. (R. 259-269) 
9. Judge Elicerio entered her Order on Motion to Amend on November 22, 
1996. (R. 291-296) 
10. Judge Elicerio provided a detailed legal analysis of the issues raised by Mr. 
Burgess' motions and the Workers Compensation Fund's response to those motions. 
(R. 293-294) In her analysis, Judge Elicerio did acknowledge that there is confusion 
based upon the decisions \x\Avisv. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) 
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and Middlestadt v. Industrial Commission, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). (R. 293-
294) 
1 1 . Mr. Burgess filed his Motion for Review on December 20, 1 996 contesting 
Judge Elicerio's denial of his Motion to continue his claim for future benefits without 
date. (R. 311-315) 
12. The Workers Compensation Fund filed its response to Mr. Burgess' Motion 
for Review. (R. 297-310) 
13. The Industrial Commission of Utah entered its Order of Motions for Review 
on June 9, 1997. (R. 341-345) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is not a case in which an injured worker is asking this court to allow the 
Industrial Commission to change or circumvent any statute of limitations. This is not 
a case in which an injured worker is begging this court to permit the Industrial 
Commission to award him benefits without him satisfying the burden of proof required 
before benefits may be awarded. 
This is a case in which an injured worker, Mr. Burgess, is asking this court to 
offer him the opportunity which the Utah Supreme Court gave to Mr. Stoker in Stoker 
v. The Workers Compensation Fund, 889 P. 2d 409 (Utah 1994) to petition the 
Industrial Commission to reopen and modify its prior award of benefits. Mr. Burgess' 
request is that this court affirm the Industrial Commission's June 9, 1997 Order. By 
affirming that Order, this court will merely fol low the holding of the Utah Supreme 
Court in the Stoker case. 
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The Workers' Compensation Act requires that an injured worker file an 
Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission within six years from the date 
of an industrial accident. Once such an application is filed, the Industrial Commission 
has jurisdiction over the claim. After jurisdiction is gained by the Industrial 
Commission, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 empowers the Commission to change and 
modify its prior findings and orders. 
The ruling requested by Mr. Burgess will result in a clear decision that all the 
parties can understand and follow. Such a ruling will require an injured worker to file 
an Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission within six years from the 
date of the industrial accident. Once such an Application is filed, the Industrial 
Commission will obtain jurisdiction over the claim. That Commission can then modify 
its prior findings or orders even after the six year period has run. Such a ruling will 
produce consistent results is all claims filed with the industrial Commission. If an 
injured worker fails to file an Application for Hearing within the six year period, the 
claim will be barred. The Industrial Commission will never acquire jurisdiction over 
such an untimely filed claim and can never utilize Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 to 
circumvent any of the pertinent statutes of limitations. 
An injured worker who does file a timely application, may then petition the 
Industrial Commission to reopen and modify its prior award after the six year period. 
That injured worker will of course have to satisfy his burden of proof. 
This simple rule will also advance the public policy and interest all the parties 
by injured workers to try and return to work and not just rely upon benefits payable 
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under the Workers' Compensation Act. The injured workers will attempt to return to 
work because they will know that if their injuries are so severe as to prevent them 
from working they have the security of being able to pursue claims for benefits under 
that Act even if more than six years have past since the date of their industrial 
accident. This rule will serve the integrity of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
This court cannot forget that it was this court 's decisions in Avis and 
Middlestadt that forced Mr. Burgess to file his amended Applications for Hearing. 
Those case stand for the proposition that if an injured worker knows or should have 
known that his condition is not stable, he must file an Application for Hearing within 
the appropriate time limits. Unlike the petitioners in those case, Mr. Burgess has filed 
timely Applications for Hearing wi th the Industrial Commission. 
In this case, there is no doubt that Mr. Burgess' condition is not stable. The 
petitioners have purchased an electrical stimulator for him to use to treat his injuries. 
The petitioners have also recognized that Mr. Burgess will require ongoing medical 
care to treat his injury.3 
This court should fol low the most recent direction, and decision, of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This court should not fol low decision which is thirty-one years old 
and dealt wi th provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act that have been amended 
and modified numerous times since the old case cited by the petitioners in their brief 
was decided. 
3There Is dispute as to the type or kind of ongoing care necessary to allow Mr. Burgess to continue 
to work. The parties are in agreement that it is in their best interest if he can continue to work. It is also 
the desire of Mr. Burgess to continue to work. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE OBVIOUS READING OF UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-78 
DOES NOT OVERRIDE THE LIMITATION PERIODS 
ESTABLISHED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-98. NOR DID 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S APPLICATION IN THIS 
CASE OF §35-1-78 RESULT IN THE CIRCUMVENTION OR 
TOLLING OF ANY LIMITATIONS PERIOD. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 (1953, as amended) empowers the Industrial 
Commission wi th continuing jurisdiction to modify or change its prior orders and 
findings. The vesting of the Industrial Commission wi th continuing jurisdiction has 
been steadfastly preserved by the State Legislature as it has amended the Utah 
Workers' Compensation Act.4 
When §35-1-78 is examined in the historical context of what the underlying 
purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act is, the necessity of empowering the 
Industrial Commission wi th continuing jurisdiction becomes plain and simple to see. 
In North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 486, 200 P. 211 (1921), 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act had to 
be interpreted liberally to effectuate its "beneficent and humane objects." The 
Industrial Commission realized this when it entered its June 9, 1997 Order in this 
case. (R. 347-350) 
4The petitioners in their brief, in appendix 2, have provided this court with the history of §35-1-78 from 
1917 to the present. Each amendment to that section from 1917 to the present preserves the ongoing 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. That section also provides that the powers and jurisdiction of the 
commission over each case shall be continuing. 
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The continuing jurisdiction provision of §35-1-78 allows the Industrial 
Commission to modify or change its orders. What the petitioners fail to recognize is 
that before jurisdiction can be continuing, jurisdiction must be gained. In other words, 
the Industrial Commission cannot extend or toll the applicable limitation periods by 
simply citing §35-1-78. That section applies only if the Industrial Commission has 
jurisdiction over a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Jurisdiction is gained 
when an Application for Hearing is filed wi th the Industrial Commission within the 
applicable limitation periods contained in §35-1-98 or any of the other pertinent 
statutes of limitations contained in the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The threshold query is whether the Applications for Hearing filed by Mr. 
Burgess were filed timely? If they were filed timely, then the Industrial Commission 
is empowered by §35-1-78 wi th continuing jurisdiction to modify or change its prior 
findings and orders. 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act limits the type of damages an injured 
workers may recover when injured while working. For example, an injured worker is 
not compensated for all lost wages sustained due to an industrial injury, an injured 
worker is not compensated for pain and suffering as a result of an industrial injury, 
and an injured worker is not compensated for the loss of future earning capacity due 
to an industrial injury. Realizing that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act denies an 
injured worker the right to be fully compensated vis-a-vis a common law tort action, 
the State Legislature has sought to partially remedy such inequity by allowing the 
injured worker to assert entitlement to benefits beyond the limitation periods. The 
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caveat to such an assertion is that the initial Application for Hearing must be filed 
within the applicable limitation period. 
In Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), this court was 
called upon to determine whether a claim for benefits filed with the Industrial 
Commission twenty-two years after the industrial accident was barred by §35-1-99. 
After analyzing the issue, this court did rule that such a claim was barred. This court 
did appreciate the fact that the petitioner in Avis knew "of the injury and could have 
filed for compensation within the statutory period/' Id. at 588. 
This court also ruled that the "workers' compensation statute, however, does 
not require stabilization before fi l ing/' Id. In other words, what that statute required 
was a timely filing. This court then poignantly observed that in order to avoid a claim 
from being barred based upon a statute of limitations defense is "to timely file." Id. 
Mr. Burgess did just that. He filed his two Applications for Hearing with the Industrial 
Commission in a timely manner. 
In Middlestadt v. Industrial Commission, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993) this 
court was confronted with the issues raised in the Avis case. This court affirmed its 
Avis ruling when it issued its decision in the Middlestadt case. This court once again 
ruled that if the petitioner knew that his condition was not stable "at the end of the 
time period, he could have filed" for additional benefits "to allow for future loss of 
earnings." Id. at 1014. 
All the parties in this case know that Mr. Burgess' condition is not stable. That 
is why Mr. Burgess has filed for additional benefits within the prescribed time limits. 
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Mr. Burgess does understand that the mere filing of an Application for Hearing does 
not automatically entitle him to benefits. He still must present evidence to support his 
claim for additional benefits. 
In Stoker v. The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah the appellant injured his 
lower back in 1 982 while at work. The Industrial Commission awarded him benefits 
in 1987. In 1 9 9 1 , after undergoing more conservative medical treatment, the 
appellant had back surgery. He applied for additional benefits fol lowing the back 
surgery. The Industrial Commission denied his Application for Hearing based upon the 
eight year statute of limitations. 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled that the appellant in that case could "ask the 
Commission to reopen and modify its prior award if [he] can overcome the substantial 
issues of causation that exist." Id. at 412 The Utah Supreme Court articulated and 
recognized the principle Mr. Burgess is urging this court to affirm. That principle is 
that once the Industrial Commission has gained jurisdiction, it can modify its prior 
award even after the statute of limitations for the filing of a claim has run. This is a 
simple rule, which is consistent wi th the prior decisions of this court as well as the 
Utah Supreme Court. The clear articulation of this simple rule by this court will clarify 
the obvious confusion of the Industrial Commission and preserve the integrity of the 
Workers' Compensation Act. 
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POINT II. 
THE PETITIONER'S RELIANCE UPON UNITED STATES 
SMEL TING, REFINING AND MINING COMPANY V. NIELSEN 
IS MISPLACED. 
The petitioners in their brief cite and rely upon United States Smelting, Refining 
and Mining Company v. Nielsen, 430 P. 2d 162 (Utah 1967) to support their argument 
that the Industrial Commission's June 9, 1997 Order should be reversed. In that case, 
the applicant was injured in a mine cave-in 1952. The applicant received payments 
pursuant to the then existing version of Utah Code Ann, §35-1-66 (1953) which 
provided for the payment of benefits to an injured worker for upwards of six years 
from the date of the injury. Id, at 162. The applicant then filed a claim for additional 
benefits in 1965, approximately 13 years after the date of the accident. The court in 
denying the applicant's claim for additional benefits relied upon the fact that he failed 
to file his claim within the applicable three and six year statutes of limitations. Id, at 
164 
The petitioners in this case then cite in their brief the applicable section of the 
Utah Code to persuade this court that the Industrial Commission erred when it entered 
its June 9, 1997 Order. (Petitioners' brief at pg. 20-21) 
The appropriate version of Utah Code Ann, §35-1-66 (permanent partial 
disability benefits) does not contain a specific limitations period. Thus, this court must 
look toward Utah Code Ann, §35-1-98 which merely requires that an Application for 
Hearing is filed within six years after the date of the accident. Mr. Burgess filed just 
such Applications on both of his compensable industrial accidents. 
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The applicable version of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 (permanent total disability 
benefits) also does not include a specific limitations period. Again, this court must 
then turn to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98 which mandates that an Application for 
Hearing be filed within six years from the date of the accident. 
Finally, Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -65(1) (temporary total disability benefits) is also 
devoid of a specific filing period. That section ostensibly contains a time limit within 
which such benefits may be payable. Once again, this court must turn to the six year 
filing limitation imposed by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98. 
The inescapable, and only, conclusion this court can reach is that Mr. Burgess 
has complied wi th all limitation periods that effect his claim for additional benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act by filing his Applications for Hearing 
within six years from the dates of his two compensable industrial accidents. More 
importantly, Mr. Burgess has satisfied what the Utah Supreme Court in its recent, 
unanimous decision held in Stoker v. The Worker Compensation Fund of Utah, 889 
P . 2 d a t 4 1 2 . 
In Stoker the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"[ that] it would be ironic for [the Workers' Compensation] 
Act to be construed in such a fashion that a worker who 
undertakes a conservative course of therapy within time 
allowed by the statute, which if effective would save the 
Fund money and be less risky to the worker, would be 
denied benefits when that course proves ineffective and a 
more aggressive therapy must be pursued, resulting in 
temporary total disability that occurs outside the eight-year 
period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken 
at the time of the less aggressive therapy, Stoker would 
have met the requirements for additional total disability 
benefits." Id. 
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It would be distressing if this court failed to recognize just how ironic it is to bar 
Mr. Burgess' claims for future benefits because he is continuing to work with his 
injuries. It should be noted that the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah in the Stoker 
case admitted, for purposes of its brief filed in that case, that if Mr. Stoker 
experienced a period of temporary total disability more than eight years after his 
industrial accident, he should be put to his burden of proof before the Industrial 
Commission to prove that his ongoing health problems are reasonably related to his 
industrial accident. Id. 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, in its brief filed in the Stoker case, 
apparently acknowledge the Industrial Commission's power to modify prior awards 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78. It was after citing the Workers Compensation 
Fund of Utah's brief, that the Utah Supreme Court ruled: 
"[that] Stoker may ask the Commission to reopen and 
modify its prior award if [he] can overcome the substantial 
issue of causation that exist." 
Mr. Burgess is just asking for the same opportunity accorded to Mr. Stoker by 
the Utah Supreme Court. Mr. Burgess is not asking this court to overrule any statute 
of limitations and he is not asking this court to relieve him from having to meet his 
burden of proof. Mr. Burgess is asking this court for the opportunity to present his 
claim for additional benefits to the Industrial Commission if his effort to continue 
working with his injuries becomes to much for him and he needs the relief guaranteed 
him by the Workers' Compensation Act. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Burgess respectfully prays that this court affirm the June 9, 1997 Order on 
Motions for Review. By affirming that Order, this court will also affirm the social and 
legal intent underlying the Workers' Compensation Act. That intent is to insure that 
injured workers and their families will not be abandoned and denied the benefits 
pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act by uncaring employers and insurance 
carriers. 
Dated this 30th day of January 1998. 
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Tabl 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-98 (1990) 
[Effective May 9, 1967-April 22, 1990.] 
*1990 Repeal and Reenactment* 
Section 35-1-98 was repealed in 1990 and reenacted to read as follows: 
35-1-98. Claims and benefits. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's 
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably 
related to the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to his employer or insurance carrier 
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years. 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability 
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is barred, 
unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission within six years after the date of 
the accident. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is filed within one year of 
the date of death of the employee. 
[Effective April 23, 1990-present.] 
Tab 2 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-78 (1990) 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified. 
[Effective 1917-May 8, 1961.] 
*1961 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability, which have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 
years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
[Effective May 9, 1961-June30, 1963.] 
*1963 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which 
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
[Effective July 1, 1963-June30, 1965.] 
*1965 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify — Authority to destroy records. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which 
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
[Effective July 1, 1965-May 11, 1981.] 
*1981 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which 
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
Awards made by the industrial commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988.] 
* 1988 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten 
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit pavment would have otherwise become due and pavable. 
(3) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Compensation Act. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in 
Subsection (a) in any respect. 
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990.] 
* 1990 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten 
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in 
Subsection (a) in any respect 
[Effective April 23, 1990-May 1, 1994 ] 
*1994 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award - Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten 
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable 
(3) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in 
Subsection (3)(a) in any respect. 
[Effective May 2, 1994-April 30, 1995.] 
* 1995 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records - Interest on award - No authority to change statutes of limitation -
Authority to approve final settlement claims. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases 
of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98, may 
be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(3) Awards made by the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the 
date when each benefit pavment would have otherwise become due and payable 
(4) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in 
Subsection (4)(a) in any respect. 
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 35-1-90, the commission shall review and may 
approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under 
Chapters 1 and 2; 
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit 
entitlements under Chapters 1 and 2 by means of a lump sum payment, structured 
settlement, or other appropriate payout. 
[Effective May 1, 1995-present.] 
Tab 3 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 STOKER v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
889 P 2d. 409 (Utah 1994) 
STOKER v. WORKERS' 
Ciieas889 P.2d 
Kyle STOKER, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
The WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH and the Industrial Commis-
sion for the State of Utah, Defendants 
and Appellees. 
No. 920386. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 2. 1994. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. S, 1995. 
Workers' compensation claimant who 
was denied additional temporary total dis-
ability benefits hased on statutory eight-year 
time limitation on such benefits brought ac-
tion seeding determination that temporary 
total disability statute was unconstitutional. 
The Second District Coun. Weber County, 
David E. Roth. J., ruled that statute was 
constitutional, and claimant appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewan. Associate C.J.. held 
that statutory eight-year period did not oper-
ate as a statute of repose with respect to 
claimant who asserted claim for temporary 
total disability benefits and lost right to file a 
second time for benefits as result of his 
choice of the type of treatment he wanted to 
undertake within the limited time left under 
the statute. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, C.J., concurred in result. 
1. Workers' Compensation c=»S39, 842 
Under workers' compensation statute, 
ten\pwar>- \.o\a& &yabi\i\\* benefit* are sub-
ject to three limitations: they are payable 
only for a maximum of 312 weeks at rate of 
100% of the state average weekly wage and 
benefits must be paid within eight years of 
the date of injury, even if they have been 
paid to injured worker for less than 312 
weeks when eight-year period expires. 
U.C.A.1953. 35-1-65(1). 
*• Workers' Compensation C=>1846 
Claims on appeal that eight-year period 
•« temporary- total disability statute violated 
COMP. FUND OF UTAH Utah 409 
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due process provision of State Constitution 
and constituted unconstitutional cap on dam-
ages were waived, where claimant failed to 
present these claims to the trial court. 
Const. Art. 1, § 7; U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65(1). 
3. Workers' Compensation C=>2, 6 
Workers' Compensation Act is compre-
hensive statutory scheme that provides rem-
edies for injuries to workers occurring in 
course of their employment, irrespective of 
fault, in lieu of common-law tort actions. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq. 
4. Workers' Compensation 0=1003 
Temporary total disability benefits, tem-
porary partial disability benefits, permanent 
partial and permanent total disability bene-
fits, medical expenses for injured employees, 
-anti oVner certain benefits Tmuer NNurkeTs' 
Compensation Act, whether \iewed individu-
ally or together, are not analogous to an 
ordinary lump-sum judgment that the com-
mon law provides for personal injury actions; 
not only may benefits under Act be paid over 
period of time rather than in lump-sum judg-
ment, but award of benefits does not general-
ly have the res judicata effect of a judgment. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65. 35-1-65.1, 35-1-81. 
5. Workers' Compensation o=>26 
Since statutory provisions were not fa-
cially unconstitutional. Supreme Court would 
presume that 312-week limitation and eight-
year limitation on temporary total disability 
benefits under Workers' Compensation Act 
were constitutional, although it was not clear 
why legislature imposed them. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-65(1). 
6. Constitutional Law e=>48(l) 
It is burden of one attacking constitu-
tionality of statutory provision to demon-
strate that provision is unconstitutional. 
7. Limitation of Actions c=>165 
Whether statute that bars or terminates 
claim for relief is statute of limitations or 
statute of repose depends on nature of the 
statute and manner in which it operates to 
cut off legal right of person to obtain remedy 
for an injury. 
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8. Workers' Compensation <3=>839 
Eight-year limitation in workers' com-
pensation statute stating that temporary to-
tal disability compensation benefits shall not 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of state 
average weekly wage at time of the injury 
over period of eight years from date of the 
injury did not operate as a statute of repose 
in the case of a claimant who asserted claim 
for temporary total disability benefits and 
lost the right to file a second time for tempo-
rary total disability benefits as a result of his 
choice of the type of treatment he wanted to 
undertake within the limited time left under 
the statute: eight-year statutory limitation 
barred claimant's remedy because of the 
choice he made. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65(1). 
9. Workers' Compensation <2>1795 
Workers' compensation claimant who 
undertook consen'ative course of therapy 
within time allowed by temporary total dis-
ability statute and who then pursued more 
aggressive course of treatment which result-
ed in temporary total disability outside the 
eight-year statutory period could ask Indus-
trial Commission to reopen and modify its 
prior award if claimant could overcome the 
substantial issues of causation that existed. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-65(1). 
Martin W. Custen. James R. Hasenyager. 
Patrick F. Holden. Ogden. for plaintiff. 
Dennis V. Lloyd, James R. Black, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants. 
STEWART. Associate Chief Justice: 
Kyle Stoker tiled a complaint in the dis-
trict court seeking a ruling that Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-65(1) of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act ("Act") is unconstitutional under 
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution 
insofar as it provides that no temporary total 
disability benefits may be paid after eight 
years from the time of an injury-causing 
accident. The district court held the provi-
sion constitutional, and Stoker appeals. 
Stoker injured his lower back on October 
13, 1982, and again on November 15, 1982. 
while working for a construction company as 
a laborer. His back condition deteriorated. 
and surgery was performed on January 13, 
1987. The Industrial Commission awarded 
Stoker temporary total disability benefits in 
the amount of $4,788.76 for an approximately 
22-week period from December 24. 1986, 
through May 24, 1987. The Commission also 
awarded Stoker partial disability benefits in 
the amount of $6,627.85, medical expenses, 
and attorney fees. 
After his surgery. Stoker's back condition 
continued to deteriorate. In May 1990. less 
than eight years from the date of his injury. 
Stoker's treating physician advised the 
Workers' Compensation Fund ("Fund"' that 
because of chronic unrelenting pain. Stoker 
should be evaluated for spinal fusion surgery. 
However, Stoker and his doctor decided first 
to try the more consen'ative treatment pro-
vided by a pain clinic program to try :.j avoid 
surgery. The Fund authorized and paid for 
that therapy, but it was unsuccessful In 
January 1991, Stoker underwent a spinal fu-
sion. 
[1] Stoker applied for additional :empo-
rary total disability benefits for the period 
relating to the second surgery. The Com-
mission denied the application based on the 
eight-year time limitation on temporary total 
disability benefits in Utah Code Ann. $ 35-
1-65(1). In pertinent pan. that section 
states: "In no case shall such [temporary 
total disability] compensation benefits exceed 
312 weeks at the rate of lOO'r of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury orer a period of enjht years fnun the 
date of the injury." (Emphasis added.) Un-
der this provision, temporary total <usability 
benefits are subject to three limitations: (1) 
they are payable only for a maximum of 312 
weeks, (2) at a rate of LOOCr of the state 
average weekly wage, and (3) the benefits 
must be paid within eight years of the date of 
the injury, even if they have been paid to an 
injured worker for less than 312 weeks when 
the eight-year period expires. 
Stoker argues that the eight-year period 
violates the Due Process and Open Courts 
provisions in Article 1. Sections 7 and 11. 
respectively, of the Utah Constitution be-
cause the limitation is an unconstitutional 
statute of repose under Berry r. Btech Air-
craft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah l^o), and 
STOKER v. WORKERS' 
Cite as 889 P.2d 
Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 795 
P.2d li:fr (Utah 1990), or an unconstitutional 
cap on damages under the ruling in Condc-
murin r. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989). 
The Fund argues that the eight-year provi-
sion is neither a statute of limitations nor a 
statute of repose because it does not totally 
bar compensation. Rather, the Fund argues, 
the provision limits only the total amount of 
temporan- total disability benefits and the 
time within which an injured worker can 
receive such benefits, whether the benefits 
claimed are the total allowable or less than 
the total allowable. The Fund also states 
that such benefits are pan of an airay of 
remedies provided by the Act, some of which 
can continue indefinitely. Sec Kcnnecott 
Copper Cor}), v. Industrial Comm'n. 597 P.2d 
875, 877 (Utah 1979): se( also Utah Code 
Ann. S 35-1-99.2) (1988). 
[2] Because Stoker failed to present to 
the tiial coun his due process claim and the 
claim that the limitations in § 35-1-tf5(1) 
constitute an unconstitutional cap on dam-
ages, we decline to address those claims. 
We therefore address only the claim that 
§ 35-1-65(1) is an unconstitutional statute of 
repose. 
[3,4] The Workers' Compensation Act is 
a comprehensive statutory scheme that pro-
vides remedies for injuries to workers occur-
ring in the course of their employment, irre-
spective of fault, in lieu of common law tort 
actions. The Act provides temporary total 
disability benefits, $ 35-1-65; temporary 
partial disability benefits, § 35-1-65.1; per-
manent panial and permanent total disability 
benefits, § 35-1-81; and medical expenses 
for injured employees, § 35-1-81. as well as 
certain other benefits. These remedies, 
whether \iewed individually or together, are 
not analogous to an ordinary lump-sum judg-
ment that the common law provides for per-
sonal injury actions. Not only may benefits 
be paid over a period of time rather than in a 
lump-sum judgment, but an award of benefits 
*• See also Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d 
537 (Utah Ct.App. 1993); Wrolstad v. Industrial 
COMP. FUND OF UTAH Utah 4 1 1 
409 (Utah 1994) 
does not generally have the res judicata ef-
fect of a judgment. 
[5,6] While it is not clear why the Legis-
lature imposed both a 312-week limitation 
and an eight-year limitation on temporary 
total disability benefits, we presume that 
those provisions are constitutional. Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572. 580 (Utah 1993); 
Be union v. ANR Prod. Co.. 819 P.2d 343, 345 
(Utah 1991); Greenwood r. City of N. Salt 
Lake, 817 P.2d 816. 819 (Utah 1991). They 
clearly are not facially unconstitutional under 
Berry and its progeny. It is the burden of 
one attacking the constitutionality of a statu-
tory provision to demonstrate that the provi-
sion is unconstitutional. 
[7] Whether a statute that bars or termi-
nates a claim for relief is a stature of limita-
tions or a statute of repose depends on the 
nature of the statute and the manner in 
which it operates to cut off the legal right of 
a person to obtain a remedy for an injury. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d at 575-76; sa also Berry. 
717 P.2d at 672; Dan sic v. Anderson Lum-
ber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 115^-59 (Utah Ct. 
App.1994); Hales v. Industrial Comm'n. 854 
P.2d 537. 539 (Utah Ct.App.1993, Although 
$ 35-1-65 might act to cut off a claim a 
worker may have for temporary total disabil-
ity benefits and possibly raise a constitution-
al issue under Berry, ] that is not the case 
here. 
[8] In this case, § 35-1-65 did not oper-
ate as a statute of repose. The eight-year 
bar did not preclude Stoker from assening a 
claim for temporan- total disability benefits. 
In fact, he did assen a claim. He received 
such benefits from December 24, 1986, 
through May 24. 1987. He couid even have 
received a second award of such benefits for 
temporan' total disability resulting from sur-
gery for a condition causally connected to his 
industrial accident if he had known of the 
necessity for additional medical treatment 
and had undergone the surgery prior to the 
expiration of the eight-year period. 
Stoker must have known that a spinal fu-
sion would result in a period of temporary 
Comm'n, 786 P.Zci 243 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). 
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total disability. He lost the right to file a 
second time for temporary total disability 
benefits as a result of his choice of the type 
of treatment he wanted to undertake within 
the limited time left under the statute. The 
eight-year limitation barred his remedy be-
cause of the choice he made. That kind of 
bar does not operate as a statute of repose 
under Bemj and its progeny. See Ganfin, 
S67 P.2d at 576. 
[9] Nevertheless. Stoker may still have a 
remedy under the Act. It would be ironic 
for the Act to be construed in such a fashion 
that a worker who undeitakes a conservative 
course of therapy within the time allowed by 
the statute, which if effective would save the 
Fund money and be less risky to the worker, 
would be denied benefits when that course 
proves ineffective and a more aggressive 
therapy must then be pursued, resulting in 
temporary total disability that occurs outside 
the eight-year period. Had the more aggres-
sive therapy been undeitaken at the time of 
the less aggressive therapy. Stoker would 
have met the requirements for additional to-
tal disability benefits. 
The Industrial Commission and the Fund 
both seem to recognize as much in their 
brief. They state: 
For the purposes of WCFs Brief and for 
that purpose only WCF concedes the plain-
tiff experienced a period of temporary total 
disability related to his industrial accident 
of October 13. 1982, while employed by Big 
D Construction Company more than eight 
years after his industrial accident. Plain-
tiff should be put to his burden of proof 
before the Industrial Commission of Utah 
to prove that any continuing problem is 
reasonably related to his industrial acci-
dent. 
The brief then states, "The Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction to modify its prior 
award herein pursuant to Section 35-1-78 
U.C.A." -' Section 35-l-78(3)(b) provides, 
however, that "[t]he commission has no pow-
er to change the [applicable] statutes of limi-
tations.** In short, Stoker may ask the Com-
mission to reopen and modify its prior award 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) provides in pan: 
'The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing. The commis-
if Stoker can overcome the substantial issues 
of causation that exist. 
Affirmed. 
HOWE and DURHAM. JJ.. and ORME, 
Court of Appeals Judge, concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J.. concurs in the result 
ORME, Court of Appeals Judge, sat to fill 
the vacancy on the Court. 
Co | KEY NijMgSF SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
V. 
Jason Alan LOWDER, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 930412. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 16. 1994. 
Rehearing Denied Feb. 16. 1995. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
District Court, Washington County, James L. 
Shumate, J., of aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child. Defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham. J., held that: (!) sexual 
abuse statute prohibited nonsexual assault 
directed to sexual pans of child's body; (2) 
conviction was supported by sufficient evi-
dence; and (3) denial of defendant's morion 
to enter conviction of lesser offense of misde-
meanor child abuse was proper. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law C=>1134<3) 
Interpretation of statute is question of 
law, which Supreme Court reviews for cor-
rectness. 
sion. after notice and hearing, may from tfli>c 
time modify or change its prior findings a00 
orders." 
